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N A T U R E O F CASE 
These are three consolidated actions brought by 
residents of Salt Lake County against the State of 
Utah, Salt Lake County and Gibbons & Reed Company 
to recover for damage to their properties which occur-
red in connection with an extremely heavy cloudburst 
in August, 1969. The claim of plaintiff Robert P . 
Kunkel, et ux., relates also to a separate rainstorm 
which occurred in April, 1969. Cross-claims were filed 
by the State of Utah and Salt Lake County against 
Gibbons & Reed, which in turn counterclaimed against 
the cross-claimants. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
The matter was tried, as to the liability issues only, 
before a jury, with the Honorable Ernest F . Baldwin, 
Jr., presiding. At the conclusion of an eleven-day trial, 
the matter was submitted to the jury on special inter-
rogatories. As noted in plaintiffs' brief, the jury found 
that the highway project of defendant State of Utah 
was unreasonably defective or dangerous. They also 
found that defendant Salt Lake County had unreason-
ably created a defective or dangerous condition in the 
utilization of its storm drains and that it was negligent 
in failing to provide reasonably adequate drainage fa-
cilities for the highway project. Thus, the jury found 
all issues against those defendants and in favor of the 
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' statement as to the disposition of 
the matter in the lower court seems calculated to give 
*> 
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the impression that the jury also found all issues 
against defendant Gibbons & Reed. However, this is 
not true. Six interrogatories were found in favor of 
this defendant. Plaintiffs' treatment of this aspect of 
the matter is, at best, misleading and unfair. 
At the conclusion of two hearings following the 
trial, the trial court ruled that the State of Utah was 
liable for the damages to all plaintiffs as a result of the 
flood, but that Salt Lake County and Gibbons & Reed 
were not liable for such damages. The court also ruled 
that Gibbons & Reed was not liable under the cross-
claims of the State of Utah and Salt Lake County. 
An amended order and judgment incorporating such 
rulings was entered on May 15, 1974. 
NATURE OF RELIEF 
SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondent Gibbons & Reed Company 
seeks affirmance of the order and judgment of the 
trial court. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
While it may be somewhat natural for an advocate 
to emphasize most strongly the facts that support his 
position, plaintiffs' brief carries that tendency to an 
unwarranted extreme. There is, in fact, almost a total 
disregard of any facts which favor Gibbons & Reed and 
support the actions of the trial court. For that reason, 
3 
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Gibbons & Reed deems it necessary to bring to the 
court's attention a number of other facts which, it be-
lieves, will disclose to the court the basis for the rulings 
of the court below. 
First, the construction phase of the highway pro-
ject, Interstate 215, was preceded by many years of 
planning and study, particularly as to the drainage as-
pects (T. 1621, T. 1698, T. 1767). As noted by plain-
tiffs, Salt Lake County retained a prominent engin-
eering firm, Caldwell, Richards and Sorenson, to pre-
pare a Master Storm Drain Study in 1964 (T. 1621-
23). Thereafter, another prominent engineering firm, 
Nielson & Maxwell, made further studies and com-
pleted the design of the drainage system (T. 1698-
1700). The highway project, including the drainage 
system, was then designed by a consulting engineering 
firm, Rader & Associates, of Miami, Florida, (T. 
1719). Finally, the detailed engineering and designing 
of the drainage facilities was performed by specialists 
in the Department of Highways (T. 1741). Many 
months of design work were spent by the department's 
hydraulic engineer and others even after the numerous 
studies and engineering work that had been accomp-
lished earlier (T. 1767). Gibbons & Reed had only 
three weeks after receipt of the plans and specifications 
to complete and submit its bid for the construction of 
the highway project, including the relocation of num-
erous utilities and installation of the drainage facilities 
(T..1776). 
4 
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At the time of the flood, the drainage system had 
been fully completed and was in operation (T. 1481. 
T. 1556, T. 1589, T. 1802). This included various in-
lets and other aspects of the drainage systems to the 
east of the highway project (T. 1589, T. 1774, T. 
1803). That system was expected to handle all of the 
runoff water which fell above the project (T. 1766, T. 
1773-4). Curbing had not yet been installed on the 
west side of relocated Wasatch Boulevard. However, 
the center crest in Wasatch Boulevard is more than 
six-inches high (T. 1778), so the only water that the 
curb would have contained would have been that which 
fell between it and the crest, a relatively nominal 
amount (T. 1761, T. 1788). 
As a number of photographs so graphically depict, 
the flood was of such immense proportions that a six-
inch curb would have done little, if any, good (Exh. 
101D ,104D, 105D, 107D). The photographs further 
show that in the area where there were curbs, they were 
completely filled with silt (Exh. 94D, 96D, 97D), and 
this was above the project where no construction had 
taken place. The west cutbanks, which were not sub-
jected to the heavy floods from above, withstood the 
same rains with virtually no damage (Exh. 67-69P). 
This same photographic evidence, coupled with testi-
mony from the Department of Highway's project en-
gineer (T. 1516-17, T. 1556) also disclosed that no 
amount of precautions by Gibbons & Reed would have 
served to "protect the project" from the devastating 
waters that poured over the east cutbank. 
5 
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The evidence was undisputed that Gibbons & Reed 
constructed the highway project entirely in accordance 
with the plans and specifications furnished by the State 
of Utah (T. 1556, 1584). There were no deviations 
from these plans and specifications and no problems 
arose during the construction in connection with the 
scheduling of the work by Gibbons & Reed (T. 1409, 
R. 350-380). All work was done in accordance with 
directions from the project engineer and his staff (T. 
1407, T. 1448, R. 335-36). There were numerous in-
spectors on the job at all times, inspecting every aspect 
of the construction (T. 1406, T. 1792). All work was 
staked by the Department of Highways and Gibbons 
& Reed was required to follow these stakes within toler-
ances of a quarter of an inch (T. 1974). 
Plaintiffs argue that while Gibbons & Reed con-
structed the highway project in accordance with plans 
and specifications and at the State's direction, it had 
discretion as to the sequence in which it accomplished 
various steps of the project. This argument is correct 
only to a very limited degree. I t does not take into con-
sideration either the inspection processes or the realities 
of construction work. The project could not be com-
pleted in a single stroke and the normal sequencing of 
events, required by good construction practices, dic-
tated the order in which work was to be done (T. 1239, 
T. 1488, T. 1575, T. 1790). There are only two matters, 
for example, which could have any possible signific-
ance in connection with plaintiffs' appeal. One is the 
6 
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fact that the concrete ditch liners had not been installed 
at the time of the flood. However, the evidence was 
clear that the concrete travel lands were just being 
poured and that it was necessary to then install asphalt 
shoulders and to grade from the shoulders to the surface 
on which the concrete ditch liners would be installed 
(T. 1488, T. 1790).l 
Similar sequencing problems prevented the instal-
lation of the curb on relocated Wasatch Boulevard. At 
the time of the flood, it was still necessary to install 
a high chain-link right-of-way fence (T. 1804) and 
part of the topsoil (T. 1411). This had to be com-
pleted before the curb was installed in order to prevent 
damage to the curb from vehicles and posthole diggers 
which would be required to install the fence. (T. 1804). 
In any event, as indicated above, there was no evidence 
showing that installation of such curb would have pre-
vented any damage. 
Wliile plaintiffs make other arguments regarding 
the so called "protection of the project" during con-
struction, these arguments are either disputed by the 
evidence or are grounded upon pure speculation. They 
argue, for example, that no grates had been placed 
over the storm drain laterals. The evidence is clear that 
such grates were not called for and the inlets were in-
i In any case, the jury specifically found that Gibbons & Reed 
Company had not failed to take reasonable precautions to pro-
vide proper drainage during the construction of the project (Int. J(2)) . 
7 • 
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stalled in accordance with the plans, specifications and 
directions of the State of Utah (T. 1743-45). The in-
lets had no provisions to accommodate grates (T. 1515, 
T. 1581), and to have installed grates would have been 
in violation of the plans and specifications (T. 1553). 
Moreover, the weight of the evidence indicated that such 
grates would have had a tendency to plug-up sooner 
than uncovered inlets (T. 1555, T. 1768, T. 1857). 
Plaintiffs also contend that no grass, sod or other ma-
terials had been placed, permanently or temporarily, 
to prevent erosion of the cutbank. There was no pro-
vision for installation of sod and the State would not 
allow the cutbank to be seeded until after September 
1st (T. 1578). In any event, the photographs again 
graphically illustrate that neither sod nor seed would 
have had any effect (Exh. 39D, 94-95D, 97D, 101-
105D). But beyond that, plaintiffs have ignored the 
fact that at the time of the flood the cutbanks had been 
graded to final level and Gibbons & Reed was in the 
process of spreading topsoil on them (T. 1411-15). 
Thus, it would have been impossible to have had the 
banks covered with sod, seed, burlap or anything else. 
The contract between the State of Utah and Gib-
bons & Reed provided that the latter would be respons-
ible for any storm damages unless the storm was of 
such unusual violence as to constitute an unforeseeable 
cause beyond the contractor's control, in which case the 
State would be responsible (T. 1447-8). In the present 
case, the State had paid Gibbons & Reed under such 
8 
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contractual provision for all of the reconstruction work 
following the flood (T. 1829). 
The damage sustained by plaintiffs Kunkel in 
April came from an entirely different drainage area 
and occurred before the engineering system had been 
installed and was functioning (T. 1373). The jury 
found that Gibbons & Reed had no liability as to the 
Kunkels (R. 727). 
The storm which resulted in the flooding was of 
unusual intensity. Meteorologist Mark Eubank, called 
by the State of Utah, testified that it exceeded all other 
recorded storms in the State of Utah (T. 1612, T. 
1615) with two and one-half inches of water falling 
in approximately thirty minutes (T. 1600, T. 1615). 
Even plaintiffs' witness, a long-time meteorologist in 
the State, testified that he knew of only one or two 
local storms which would equal it in intensity (T. 1319). 
The project engineer for the Department of Highways, 
who had been in charge of many highway projects, 
testified that no highway project on which he had ever 
been associated had sustained the amount of flood dam-
age the present one did (T. 1517), although during its 
construction a number of heavy rainstorms had occur-
red which had resulted in very little damage (T. 1556). 
Despite a great amount of silt deposited at the lower 
terminus of the project, there was actually very little 
erosion along the medians or shoulders themselves (T. 
1577, T. 1806). 
9 
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Finally, Mr. Knowlton, the project engineer testi-
fied that he had given the matter considerable thought 
and couldn't think of any measures that could have 
been taken which would have accommodated the run-
off water to which the project was subjected (T. 1516). 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
Under the evidence adduced at the trial, defendant 
Gribbons <§ Reed Company could not be held liable to 
plaintiffs for the flood damages sustained by them. 
Plaintiffs conclude their brief by arguing for ap-
plication of the doctrine of inverse condemnation. In 
doing so, they call attention to the fact that they sus-
tained a disproportionate loss as a result of the con-
struction of a needed public improvement. In other 
words, they sustained damage because the State of 
Utah found it necessary to construct a modern highway 
project in proximity to their homes. This really is the 
crux of the matter. From the evidence it is clear that 
flood damage to plaintiffs was caused by the inter-
action of three factors, none of which were the respons-
ibility of Gibbons & Reed. The first was the decision 
by the State of Utah to bisect the area above plaintiffs 
with the interstate highway. The second was the resi-
dential development of the area which disturbed the 
10 
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natural drainage channels.2 The third was the occur-
rence of the torrential cloudburst. In short, there was 
no evidence to indicate that Gibbons & Reed did any-
thing other than what it was lawfully retained by the 
State of Utah to do. Rather, the evidence is undis-
puted that it constructed the highway project in ac-
cordance with its contract with the State. 
The law is quite clear that under these circum-
stances, a contractor has no liability for damages that 
may result to third parties, even if such damages arose 
out of or in connection with the construction, especially 
where the construction is a public work being performed 
by a governmental authority, as it was in this case. The 
general rule in Utah in this regard is set forth in Len~ 
inger v. Steams-Roger Mfg. Co., 17 U.2d 37, 404 P.2d 
33 (1965), as follows: 
An important limitation on the rule placing 
building contractors on the same footing as sell-
ers of goods is that the contractor is not liable 
if he has merely carried out the plans, specifica-
tions and directions given him, since in that case 
the responsibility is assumed by the employer, 
at least where the plans are not so obviously 
dangerous that no reasonable man would follow 
them. (4(MP.2d33at36.) 
A case involving the construction of a public high-
way supporting the rule of Steams-Roger is Marin 
2 As stated by plaintiffs* own expert, Mr. Jacobsen, "Man's de-
velopment of this area has created a large part of the problem." 
(T. 1221). 
11 
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Municipal Water District v. Peninsula Paving Co., 34 
Cal. App. 2d 647, 94 P.2d 404 (1939). There the state's 
engineers and the defendant contractor knew of the 
existence of a pipeline. The contract provided that the 
contractor should take every precaution to preserve and 
protect the lines from injury or damage during con-
struction. The evidence, however, showed that the work 
of the defendant was planned by the State engineers 
and the construction was supervised and directed them. 
I t also showed that the work conformed to the plans 
and specifications furnished by the State and that every-
thing done by the contractor was approved by the 
State's engineers. 
In reversing a judgment against the contractor 
the court said: 
. . . So far as the contractor is conerned, the 
proper rule of liability is thus stated in North-
western Pac. R. B. Co. v. Currie, 100 Cal. App. 
1 7 3 . . . : 
Where a county contracts for the doing of 
construction work according to plans and spec-
ifications theretofore adopted, and the con-
tractor performs the work with proper care 
and skill and in conformity with the plans and 
specifications, but the work thus planned and 
specified results in an injury to adjacent prop-
erty, the liability, if any there is, for the pay-
ment of damages is upon the county under its 
obligation to compensate the damages result-
ing from the exercise of its governmental 
power . . . (94 P.2d 404 at 406.) 
12 
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The court noted that it is only where the contractor 
departs from the plans and specifications or performs 
the work in an improper or negligent manner that he 
becomes liable to third parties. Inasmuch as there was 
no testimony from a highway engineer to show that the 
defendant had performed the work in an improper man-
ner and it was undisputed that the work had been done 
in accordance with the plans and specifications, there 
was no evidence to support the finding of negligence on 
the part of the defendant. In so ruling, the court noted 
that a provision in the contract that the contractor 
should preserve and protect the pipeline "in no way 
enlarged the liability of the contractor to third persons." 
A recent case from a neighboring jurisdiction is 
Gates v. Pickett § Nelson Const. Co., 94 Idaho 836, 
432 P.2d 780 (1967), which, after adopting the general 
rule that a contractor who performs according to the 
plans and specifications is not liable for damage re-
sulting from such construction, noted that the rule was 
particularly applicable where the work was directly 
supervised by the State of Idaho through the resident 
engineer of its Highway Department. 
Other decisions demonstrate that the rule followed 
by this court in Steams-Roger is even more applicable 
where a public project is involved. These cases hold 
that after a public authority engineers a project, it is 
not in the public interest to require the contractor to 
re-engineer it. This, the courts note, would substan-
tially increase the cost of public projects and hence 
13 
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the contractor is under a duty to perform according to 
the plans and specifications furnished it. Unless they 
are patently defective, it is not the contractor's duty, 
or even its prerogative, to question the adequacy of 
such plans and specifications. 
Thus, in Wood v. Foster § Creighton Co., 191 
Tenn. 478, 235 S.W.2d 1 (1950), suit was brought 
against the contractor for removal of soil and trees re-
sulting from the sloping of a cutbank during the con-
struction of a highway. The court noted that the State 
Engineer had gone on the lots and placed stakes indi-
cating removal of the soil and trees and the sloping of 
the cutbank. In reversing the decisions of the trial and 
intermediate appellate courts, the court stated: 
I t seems to us that as a practical matter in 
construction of public improvement, the con-
tractor should be relieved from checking every 
order given it by the public authority. The state 
for whom the contractor works, does the engin-
eering, stakes out the project, tells the contractor 
what grade and what to do and so long as the 
contractor complies with these instructions by 
its superior then the contractor is fulfilling its 
obligation. If the contractor was required, at its 
peril, to check and double check all plans given 
it and required to keep an engineering force 
for the purpose of interpreting these plans, 
and was not permitted to follow the orders of 
the engineering force or its superior, then the 
' costs of public improvement would be so in-
creased as to make them almost prohibitive. The 
purpose of having the State Engineering De-
14 
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partment for these public improvements is to lay 
out these projects and to tell the contractor 
where to do its work. The contractor's work is 
not the engineering job of laying out the pro-
ject, but is merely in doing what it is instructed 
to do. So long as it does this work as it is in-
structed to do by its superior in a workmanlike 
manner, not negligently, then the contractor is 
not liable. (235 S.W.2d 1 at 2, emphasis added). 
A similar case is Southeast Construction Co. v. 
Ellis, 233 Ark. 72, 342 S.W.2d 485 (1961). In that 
case Southeast Construction entered into a contract 
with the State of Arkansas to make changes in an 
existing highway. The plans and specifications were 
prepared by the Arkansas Highway Department. 
Plaintiffs alleged that during the course of construc-
tion, defendant Southeast deposited waste material in 
a negligent fashion, resulting in damage to the plain-
tiffs. The trial court found in favor of plaintiffs and 
defendant appealed. On appeal Southeast relied on 
the single point that the undisputed testimony showed 
that the deposit of waste material by it was done in 
accordance with the specifications and instructions of 
Arkansas Highway Department and, therefore, the 
trial court erred in entering judgment for the plaintiffs. 
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Supreme 
Court of Arkansas noted: 
. . . Appellants compliance with plans and 
specifications prepared by the Highway Depart-
ment cannot be deemed to constitute negligence 
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(342S.W.2d485at488). 
The court then went on to approve an instruction 
that if the defendant performed the construction in 
accordance with its contract and the governmental auth-
ority and "with that degree of skill that is ordinarily 
possessed and exercised by contractors doing the same 
or similar work" it could not be held liable to plain-
tiffs. The court concluded: 
The appellee has been damaged. H e should 
be compensated for his damages by the respons-
ible governmental body rather than by the con-
tractor who was obligated by his contract to per-
form according to the proper directions, plans 
and specifications furnished by the State High-
way Department. (342 S.W.2d 485 at 488). 
In Engler v. Aldridge, 75 P.2d 290 (Kan. 1938), 
the court ruled that a contractor on a state highway 
project was obligated by his contract and bond to 
perform according to the plans and specifications and 
that he could neither change the plans nor quit the 
work, even if he believed the improvement was bad 
from an engineering standpoint. 
In the present case the jury's finding that Gib-
bons & Reed constructed the highway project strictly 
in accordance with the plans, specifications and direc-
tions of the project cannot be disputed. The State has 
unequivocally indicated that there was no deviation by 
the contractor and plaintiffs have introduced no evid-
16 
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ence to the contrary. Indeed, it is interesting to note 
that there is nothing in the plaintiffs' entire argument 
relating to the standard of care of a contractor under 
the circumstances of this case. And, no where in their 
brief do plaintiffs provide a standard contrary to that 
set forth in the above decisions. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I I 
The jury's findings and answers to interrogatories 
which related to issues of fact and which were supported 
by competant evidence exonerated Gibbons § Reed 
Company and the trial court acted properly in granting 
judgment in its favor. 
Having examined the standard of care and the cir-
cumstances under which a contractor in the position of 
Gibbons & Reed will be held liable for damages to third 
parties, it becomes evident that the actions of the court 
below were proper and should be affirmed. 
First, however, it is necessary to note the serious 
omissions in plaintiff's brief. As to Gibbons & Reed, 
plaintiffs have conveniently disregarded two very im-
portant factors. They make repeated references to a 
finding that Gibbons & Reed Company was negligent 
"in failing to take reasonable precautions to protect the 
project during construction", but make not mention 
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\ 
whatsoever of the fact that all other — more specific — 
interrogatories were answered in Gibbons & Reed's fav-
or. Secondly, they make repeated references to the 
jury's "verdict." They attempt to make this court un-
derstand that the trial court disregarded or overruled 
the jury's verdict. However, the record clearly shows 
that this was not the case. There was no general verdict. 
The matter was submitted to the jury on written inter-
rogatories under Rule 49(a), U.R.C.P. Consequently, 
the cases relied upon by plaintiffs to the effect that a 
jury verdict is not to be lightly set aside are not pertin-
ent. These cases involve situations where a general 
verdict had been returned by the jury, upheld by the 
trial court and appellant had maintained on appeal 
that the evidence did not support the verdict. These 
cases, in fact, generally note that the trial court is in 
a more favorable position to observe the demeanor of 
witnesses and the like and thus the presumption, on the 
part of the appellate court, is in favor of the validity 
of the jury's verdict. 
The case of Mason v. Mason, 108 Utah 428, 160 
P.2d 730 (1945), cited by plaintiffs is equally irrele-
vant. That case involved a trial without a jury and 
the interrelation of the findings and conclusions to the 
judgment. I t had nothing whatsoever to do with the 
issues presented here. In fact, the only cases cited by 
plaintiffs which dealt with written interrogatories under 
Rule 49(a) is First Security Bank v. Ezra C. Lwtdahl, 
Inc., 22 U.2d 433, 454 P.2d 886 (1969). And, as will 
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be pointed out below, this case actually supports Gib-
bons & Reed, not plaintiffs. 
Returning to the special interrogatories which were 
ignored in plaintiffs' brief, it will be seen that in light 
of the applicable law, the jury exculpated Gibbons & 
Reed. The jury found: 
1. That the highway project of the State of Utah, 
including the storm drainage system, was unreasonably 
defective or dangerous (Int. A. T. 721). 
2. Gibbons & Reed constructed the highway in 
conformance with the plans, specifications and direc-
tions given to it by the State of Utah (Int. L, T. 729). 
3. Gibbons & Reed did not negligently follow 
plans, specifications and directions that were so ob-
viously dangerous that no reasonable contractor would 
have followed them (Int. M, T. 729). 
4. Gibbons & Reed performed the work required 
by its contract with the State of Utah with that degree 
of skill and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by 
contractors doing the same or similar work in this 
locality (Int. O, T. 729). 
5. Gibbons & Reed was not negligent in failing to 
take reasonable precautions to provide proper dr lin-
age during the construction of the project (Int. J2 , T. 
728). 
6. Gibbons & Reed did not negligently collect and 
divert flood water into the low point of the highway 
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project (Int. C, T. 725). 
Additionally, the jury found that Gibbons & Reed 
was not negligent in any manner with respect to the 
flooding of the Kunkel property (Int. F , T, 727). 
Thus, it can readily be seen that contrary to plain-
tiffs' contentions, there was not a verdict in favor of 
plaintiffs and against this defendant. Consequently, 
there was no need for a motion for a judgment n.o.v., 
Gibbons & Reed had twice moved, under Rule 50(b) 
for a directed verdict and had made a motion for a judg-
ment in its favor on the interrogatories (T. 1455, T. 
1861, R. 739-40). The trial court, in its discretion, 
chose to consider and reconcile all of the findings of 
the jury and in doing so, properly granted judgment 
for Gibbons & Reed. 
The trial court's actions were justified on several 
well-recognized grounds; the first and foremost of which 
is lack of any substantial evidence to support the find-
ing. 
The general rule is stated in 76 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Trials, Section 1203: 
. . . Where there is no evidence to support it, 
a finding as to a fact included within the issues 
is not required or proper, since it is not the office 
of a special verdict to find expressly on the 
issues, but only to find facts proved which are 
within the issues. In the absence of evidence to 
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support a material finding, it may be set aside 
or stricken from the record, and in the discretion 
of the court, judgment may be entered in accord-
ance with the undisputed evidence in the case or 
the verdict may be set aside entirely and a new 
trial granted. 
The rule is supported by numerous cases. For 
example in Anchor Casualty Co. v. McGowan, 168 
Fed.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1948), the jury had answered 
special interrogatories in favor of the appellant. The 
trial court thereafter entered an order striking the 
jury's answers to Interrogatories Nos. 16 through 19. 
The appellant maintained that the court was powerless 
to set aside the findings or to change them, and that 
the most it could do was set aside the verdict and grant 
a new trial. In rejecting this contention (applying the 
federal counterpart to Rule 49(a)) , the court stated: 
There is no evidence in the record to support 
the jury's finding on special issues Nos. 16 
through 19 . . . [They] should have not been 
submitted to the jury. 
The fact that they were submitted and the 
jury answered [sic] is, however, harmless error 
There is no inconsistency in the jury's find-
ings; the fault lies in the fact that there was no 
evidence to support its findings on special issues 
Nos. 16 through 19. In such a case the court is 
justified in disregarding those of the jury's find-
ings which are without support in the evidence 
and which are immaterial to the court's judg-
ment. 
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Another case is Thompson § Kelly Co. v. TJnited 
States M •<$ S Ins. Co., 160 N.E. 668 (Mass. 1928), 
in which the court stated: 
There was no error of law in disregarding the 
answer of the jury to the question in connection 
with the other two cases . . . 
In our opinion, the finding of the jury in 
answer to this question was not warranted by 
the evidence and the judge was justified in rul-
ing as he did. 
In Gelfand v. Strohecker, 150 Fed. Supp. 655 
(N.D. Ohio 1956), the court held that an interrogatory 
which merely sought to determine if the defendant was 
negligent was one calling for a conclusion and con-
tinued : 
Even if such an interrogatory had been prop-
er, a finding of the jury that the defendant was 
negligent in any respect would not be supported 
by the evidence. 
See also Slaton v. Union Electric Ry. Co., 145 
P.2d 456 (Kan. 1944); Lynch v. City of Jamesville, 
204 N.W.2d 6 (Wis. 1973); Wintersberger v. Pioneer 
Iron <$ Metal Co., 94 N.W.2d 136 (Wis. 1959). In the 
latter case the court stated: 
If there is no credible evidence to sustain a 
jury's finding or answer, the trial court may and 
should change it. 
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The rule has been recognized by this court in Koer 
v. May fair Markets, 19 U.2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967). 
In the Koer case the rule was actually extended much 
further than it need be here. The jury had answered 
all interrogatories in favor of the plaintiff, but the trial 
court, upon motion for directed verdict, disregarded 
the answers and granted judgment in favor of the 
defendant. This court affirmed on the basis that there 
was no substantial evidence to support the findings. 
In the present case, there was absolutely no evid-
ence adduced by the plaintiffs to establish that Gibbons 
& Reed was negligent in failing to protect the project. 
The only possible evidence in this regard related to the 
drainage system and lack of grates. But the jury 
specifically found that Gibbons & Reed was not negli-
gent in failing to take reasonable precautions to pro-
vide proper drainage during the construction project 
(Int. J ( 2 ) ) . Thus, the finding under J ( l ) would 
have had to relate to something other than the drainage 
facilities. Yet a careful review of the record will in-
dicate that there were no other areas where Gibbons 
& Reed could be held responsible, particularly in light 
of the jury's answer to Interrogatories L, M and O. 
Indeed, the complaint itself would not even support 
such a finding. The trial proceeded on plaintiffs' first 
and second causes of action and these would in no way 
put Gibbons & Reed on notice that plaintiffs were 
claiming damage for alleged "failure to protect the 
project." The interrogatory was, in fact, not even 
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requested by plaintiffs, but by the State of Utah in 
connection with its cross-claim. The only mention by 
plaintiffs of any such failure was when plaintiffs at-
torney was allowed to read a portion of the specifica-
tions between the State and Gibbons & Reed which 
provided that the contractor would take precautions to 
protect the project during construction (T. 1446-51 ).3 
But, as noted in Marin Municipal Water District v. 
Peninsula Paving Co., supra: 
The provision of the contract between the 
State and defendant, above quoted, that the 
contractor should preserve and protect the pipe-
line, in no way enlarged the liability of the con-
tractor to third persons. (94 P.2d 404 at 406) 
Despite plaintiffs' persistent argument that the 
trial court abused its discretion in disregarding the 
answer to Interrogatory J (1), its contentions as to the 
manner in which that answer was supported by the 
evidence are limited (Pis. Brief pp. 31-33). Most of 
them have been answered, but will be touched upon 
here in the order that they were made. As to the remov-
al of the curb along Wasatch Boulevard, it was neces-
sary for Gibbons & Reed to remove and relocate Wa-
satch Boulevard in order to conform to its contract with 
3 The provision expressly excluded damage due to unforeseeable 
causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence 
of the contractor. A previous provision also provided that the 
contractor would not be responsible for damage to property due 
to design failure (T. 1446). 
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the State of Utah. Old Wasatch had previously occu-
pied the ground upon which the freeway was built (T. 
1472, T. 1561). Apart from the fact that there was no 
evidence to show that the small curb would have done 
anything towards holding back the torrential rainfall, 
there was no evidence to establish that Gibbons & 
Reed was negligent in following the normal sequenc-
ing procedures. And since, in a more specific finding 
(Int. No. 0), the jury found that Gibbons & Reed 
had performed the contract in accordance with the 
degree of care and skill customarily exercised by road 
contractors, the conclusion argued by plaintiffs is not 
justified. 
Plaintiffs' contention regarding the concrete ditch 
liners has been answered previously, but it is also cov-
ered by the answers under the specific interrogatories, 
particularly No. 0. Plaintiffs' only other contentions 
relate to the drainage system, which the jury resolved 
against them, is the alleged failure to plant grass or 
sod. This is also explained by the fact that its con-
tract would not allow Gibbons & Reed to plant until 
after September 1st and, certainly, there was no evid-
ence of any kind that it should have covered the cut-
banks with some other type of material pending the 
planting of such grass. Nor have plaintiffs ever ex-
plained how this would have done any earthly good in 
protecting the project from the raging waters pouring 
over the east cutbank or how it could have been accom-
plished while placing topsoil on the banks. 
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Finally, at the end of the trial there was some testi-
mony by Mr. Jacobsen that upon one job with which 
he was familiar "ditch riders" had been employed. 
However, a review of that testimony (T. 1853) will 
disclose that it constituted no evidence at all as to the 
standard Gibbons & Reed, or anyone else, should have 
followed. Plaintiffs contend their argument as to Gib-
bons & Reed by a somewhat inflamatory statement re-
garding the so called "vulnerability" of the project at 
the time of the flood. This statement is strictly con-
trary to the evidence. The project engineer, Mr. Knowl-
ton, testified that at one time there was some vulner-
ability and precautions had been taken (T. 1520), but 
all of the testimony indicated that at the time of the 
flood, the drainage system was completely installed 
and there was no reason to expect any water to cascade 
upon the highway project from above. The system had 
been designed to intercept these waters above relocated 
Wasatch Boulevard and it was anticipated by all con-
cerned that this would relieve the project from any 
water, except that which fell immediately upon it (T. 
1520, T. 1562, T. 1766, T. 1773). 
Apart from the inadequacy of the evidence, there 
are other established principles to support the actions 
of the trial court here. First is the well recognized 
rule that where answers to special interrogatories con-
flict, those which are in the nature of conclusions will 
give way to the more specific findings. Thus, in Knape 
v. Livingston Oil Co., 392 P.2d 832 (Kan. 1964), the 
court said: 
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I t also is the rule that general findings in the 
nature of conclusions, if contradicted by special 
or detailed findings, cannot prevail, but are con-
trolled by and must yield to such detailed find-
ings of ultimate facts. (392 P.2d 832 at 845). 
The court went on to hold that a finding as to 
whether the defendant was guilty of negligence was 
"general in nature and amounted to nothing more than 
a conclusion." Again, in Gelfand v. Strohecher, supra, 
the court stated: 
An interrogatory which sought merely to de-
termine whether the defendant was negligent, 
without requiring the determination of the sup-
porting facts would be improper [citing cases]. 
Such an interrogatory would illicit a bare con-
clusion without facts to support it. (1503. Supp. 
655 at 663). 
In Zieglasch v. Durr, 326 P.2d 295 (Kan. 1958), 
the court held that a special interrogatory as to whether 
the plaintiff was guilty of negligence which contributed 
to the accident was a conclusion, saying: 
It almost amounts to a conclusion of law. I t 
is therefore controlled by the undisputed facts 
and the specific findings. (326 P.2d 295 at 
298). 
Further, in 76 Am,. Jur.2d, Trials, Section 1204, 
it is said: 
A special verdict should find the facts of the 
case essential to a recovery and not conclusions 
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of law, which are exclusively for the court. How-
ever, when a special verdict contains certain con-
elusions of law, but in addition states essential 
facts from which the court may properly draw 
conclusions as to legal liability, it is not reversible 
error for the court to disregard the conclusions 
of law in the special verdict and to enter the 
verdict justified by the findings of fact. (Em-
phasis added) 
In Section 1205, ibid., the additional comment ap-
pears: 
Hence, a special verdict finding that one of 
the parties has been guilty of negligence, with-
out finding the primaiy fact on which the in-
ference is based, is a mere statement of a conclu-
sion and will not support a judgment. 
I t is also generally accepted that in interpreting 
answers to special interrogatories, the court must look 
at the answers as a whole and not single out isolated 
interrogatories. Thus, in Monson v. Dupe, 299 P.2d 
580 (Kan. 1956), it was held that isolated answers 
could not be singled out and that to give the answers 
the effect for which the appellant contended would 
compel the court to ignore other answers and instruc-
tions of the trial court. I t was further held that if the 
answers are consistent with each other and are suffici-
ently full and complete in themselves, the judgment 
must follow the special findings even though they can-
not be reconciled with the general verdict. See also 
Bohr v. Henderson, 483 P.2d 1089 (Kan. 1971). I t 
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seems clear that the jury in the present case felt that 
Gibbons & Reed had performed its duties under the 
contract competently and that it had in all instances 
complied with the plans and specifications. 
Finally, Rule 49(a) itself gives the trial court a 
certain latitude in connection with findings. For ex-
ample, it provides that the court may make findings 
on issues not submitted nor requested to be submitted 
and further allows it to submit interrogatories in the 
manner or form it deems most appropriate. I t also 
provides that where an issue is omitted without demand 
that a court may make a finding or failing to do so, 
"it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord 
with the judgment on the special verdict." 
Plaintiffs' reliance upon First Security Bank of 
Utah, N.A. v. Lwndahl, 22 U.2d 433, 454 P.2d 886 
(1969), is misplaced. In that case the trial court had 
made a further finding completely opposed to the find-
ings of the jury, even though it had purportedly ac-
cepted and approved the jury's finding. This court 
recognized the trial court's discretion to make correc-
tions of errors or defects in the findings and to make 
additional findings on issues that were not submitted, 
but merely held that the trial court could not make 
"further" findings inconsistent with those of the jury. 
Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court must give 
effect to the intention of the jury. Gibbons & Reed 
submits that is exactly what was done in the present 
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case. Plaintiffs also cite Pace v. Parish, 122 Utah 141, 
247 P.2d 273 (1952). There this court merely held 
that an attempt should be made if reasonably possible 
to harmonize seemingly inconsistent findings. Again, 
that is what was done here. 
The court determined that Interrogatory J ( l ) , as 
it related to plaintiffs, was submitted in error and that 
there was no competent evidence to support it. While 
the trial court's announced reasons for its decisions 
were not reported, it is a rule followed by this and all 
appellate courts that if there is any basis upon which 
the actions of the trial judge can be sustained, it is 
the duty of the appellate court to do so. See, e.g., Ras-
mussen v. Davis, 1 U.2d 96, 262 P.2d 488 (1953). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court concluded that the jury, in apply-
ing the applicable standard of care set forth in the in-
structions, had determined that Gibbons & Reed had 
constructed the highway project in accordance with the 
plans and specifications; that those plans and specifica-
tions were not so obviously dangerous that no reason-
able contractor would follow them, and that it had per-
formed its work with the degree of skill and care or-
dinarily possessed and exercised by other contractors 
doing the same or similar work in this locality. These 
findings were based upon clear and undisputed evid-
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ence. The trial court properly concluded that the iso-
lated answer to Interrogatory J ( l ) was not only un-
supported by the evidence, but was conclusionaiy in 
nature and could not be reconciled with these more 
specific findings (as well as two others) which exon-
erated Gibbons & Reed. Hence, it properly disre-
warded that answer. To accept the plaintiffs' conten-
tions would compel this court to ignore the facts and 
disregard the intentions of the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ralph L. Jerman 
B. L. Dart, J r . 
J E R M A N & D A R T 
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